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Corporate governance is an important aspect of the way in which companies do 
business. It regulates the conduct of those in control of the corporation. An important 
aspect of corporate governance is the establishment of structures and processes that 
enable directors to discharge their legal responsibilities.  
The global financial crisis raised many corporate governance issues and this led to 
many reviews and changes to corporate governance systems worldwide. This is the main 
reason for this research. This dissertation will focus on these reviews and changes in the 
corporate governance systems of South Africa and the United Kingdom.  
The recent collapses of high profile companies, for example, Enron and WorldCom 
in America, Parmalat in Italy and Masterbond, Saambou and Fidentia in South Africa 
have resulted in the actions, skill and diligence of directors to again come under strict 
inspection. Companies and especially directors have to realise that they do not act 
independently but that their actions and decisions impact on the societies and 
environment in which they operate. This is the main problem in this dissertation. 
The new Companies Act 71 of 2008 incorporates into statute for the first time issues 
of corporate governance. Company law sets the framework in which the company 
operates and the recommended practices set out in the King Report on Governance for 
South Africa 2009 (‘the King III Report’) and the King Code of Governance for South 
Africa 2009 (‘the Code’) provide guidance for directors as to how they should direct the 
business of the company and make decisions on behalf of the company. In this sense, 
the Companies Act of 2008 and the King III Report and the Code complement each 
other. 
The King III Report and the Code deal broadly with the responsibilities of the board 
of directors. The Report confirms that it is for the board of directors to act as the focal 
point and custodian of corporate governance. 
This dissertation is in essence an examination of the responsibilities of the board of 
directors to promote the principles of corporate governance and recommendations in 
terms of the King III Report and the Code. 
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  GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Due to international changes in the field of corporate governance and company law 
reform in South Africa, corporate governance has become an important aspect of the 
way in which companies do business. Corporate governance is the collection of law and 
practices that is grounded in the fiduciary duties of directors. It regulates the conduct of 
those in control of the company. An important feature of corporate governance is the 




The Companies Act 71 of 2008 incorporates into statute for the first time 
provisions dealing with corporate governance. Company law (the Act and the common 
law) sets the framework in which the company operates and the recommended practices 
set out in the King Report on Governance for South Africa 2009 and the King Code of 
Governance for South Africa 2009 provide guidance for directors as to how they should 
direct the business of the company and make decisions on behalf of the company. In this 
sense, the Act, the King III Report and the Code mirror each other.
2
 
The Companies Act 61 of 1973 did not have a clear set of laws regarding the 
duties and the liabilities of directors and corporate governance.
3
 An analysis of the 
duties and the liabilities of directors fall outside the scope of this dissertation.
4
  
This dissertation deals with the responsibilities of the board of directors to 
promote the principles of corporate governance and recommendations in terms of the 
King III Report and the Code.  The King III Report and the Code deal broadly with the 
responsibilities of the board of directors. The King III Report confirms that it is for the 
board of directors to act as the focal point and custodian of corporate governance.
5
 
                                                          
1
 Monray Marsellus Botha ‘The Role and Duties of Directors in the Promotion of Corporate Governance: 
A South African Perspective’ 2009 (30) Obiter 702. In this analysis Botha investigates corporate 
governance principles in South Africa and explores the importance of the role and duties of directors in 
the promotion of corporate governance principles. 
2
 Mervyn King ‘The Synergies and Interaction between King III and the Companies Act 71 of 2008’ Acta 
Juridica 446. 
3
 Botha op cit note (1) 706. 
4
 For a detailed discussion of the duties and the liabilities of directors, see Farouk HI Cassim, Maleka 
Femida Cassim, Rehana Cassim, Richard Jooste, Joanne Shev and Jacqueline Yeats Contemporary 
Company Law 2ed (2012) 505-594. 
5
 King III Report, Principle 1.1, para 1. See para 4.3 below for the responsibilities of the board of directors 
in terms of King III. Available at: http://www.library.up.ac.za/law/docs/king111report.pdf [accessed 28 
January 2014].  
2 
 
The court in South African Broadcasting Corporation Ltd v Mpofu
6
 stated: 
‘In state-owned enterprises, like other organisations, good corporate governance is 
ultimately about effective leadership.’ Jajbhay J further stressed, ‘integrity is the key 
principle underpinning good corporate governance, and that good corporate governance 
is based on a clear code of ethical behaviour and personal integrity exercised by the 




1.1 BACKGROUND TO RESEARCH 
Corporate governance became one of the crucial issues of the 1990’s as a result of a 
number of well-publicised corporate problems and scandals in the late 1980’s. Due to 
issues ranging from questionable earnings to outright fraud, businesses came under 
increasing scrutiny from shareholders and regulators alike. Corporate problems of the 
1980’s involved creative accounting, spectacular business failures, the apparent ease of 
unscrupulous directors in expropriating other stakeholders’ funds, the limited role of 
auditors, and the claimed weak link between executive compensation and company 
performance. Press comment on these issues has been prolific over the last few years, 
giving widespread publicity to the concerns being raised on how companies were being 
directed and controlled. In order to address these problems, the South African and 
British stock exchanges and interested bodies undertook a major review of corporate 
law, which included the consideration of corporate governance.
8
 
Furthermore, the global financial crisis of 2007 to 2008 is considered by many 
economists as the worst financial crisis. It resulted in the threat of total collapse of large 
financial institutions, the bailout of banks by national governments, and downturns in 
stock markets around the world. Economies worldwide slowed during this period, as 
credit tightened and international trade declined. Governments and central banks 




The main reason for this research is because the global financial crisis raised 
many corporate governance issues and this led to many reviews and changes to 
corporate governance systems worldwide.
 10
   
                                                          
6
 [2009] 4 ALL SA 169 (GSJ) para 60. 
7
 Ibid para 64. 
8
 Tshepo Mongalo ‘The Emergence of Corporate Governance as a Fundamental Research Topic in South 
Africa’ (2003) 120 SALJ 174. 
9
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%9308 [accessed 25 January 2014]. 
10
 John Birds, Bryan Clark, Iain MacNeil, Gerard McCormack, Christian Twigg-Flesner, Charlotte Villiers 
and A J Boyle Boyle and Birds’ Company law 8ed (2011) 363. 
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It is my interpretation that the ultimate goal of the reviews and changes in 
corporate governance regimes worldwide is to maintain investor confidence in the 
markets and to secure the economic growth of countries. 
 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The recent collapses of high profile companies, for example, Enron
11
 and WorldCom in 
America, Parmalat in Italy and Masterbond, Saambou and Fidentia in South Africa have 
resulted in the actions, skill and diligence of directors to again come under strict 
inspection. Companies and especially directors have to realise that they do not act 
independently but that their actions and decisions impact on the societies and 
environment in which they operate. In a report conducted by an international 
institutional investor, South Africa ranked amongst the top 25 emerging markets in 
terms of corporate governance, but it rated poorly in terms of disclosure and 
transparency. While South Africa may thus offer some of the best investment returns for 
emerging global market investors, it must still demonstrate high standards of corporate 
governance to retain such investors. If there is a lack of corporate governance, capital 
will be invested elsewhere. Good governance pays not only for the company and 
interested parties but also ensures that a company becomes a magnet for global capital. 
Thus, for South Africa to be competitive in the international investment market, it has to 




1.3 AIMS OF RESEARCH 
The aim of this research is to analyse the responsibilities of the board of directors to 
promote the principles of corporate governance and recommendations in terms of the 
King III Report and the Code. Such an analysis therefore requires research into the 
nature of corporate governance, the enforceability and efficacy of the King III Report 
and the Code, the links between the Companies Act of 2008 and the extent to which the 
directors’ responsibilities under the King III Report and the Code constitute legal duties. 
                                                          
11
 In only 15 years, Enron Corporation grew to be America’s seventh largest company, with annual 
revenues exceeding $100 billion and over 21 000 staff in more than 40 countries. However, its top 
executives had engaged in accounting manipulations in an effort to boost the company’s stock price. 
The Enron scandal, revealed in October 2001, eventually led to the bankruptcy of the Enron 
Corporation.  As a result of the scandal, new regulations and legislation were enacted to expand the 
accuracy of financial reporting for public companies. The collapse of Enron led to the enactment of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, (SOX) on 30 July 2002. 
12
 Mildred Bekink ‘An Historical Overview of the Director’s Duty of Care and Skill: From the Nineteenth 
Century to the Companies Bill of 2007’ (2008) 20 SA Merc LJ 95-96. This is linked to para 2.4 below, 
which provides for the importance of good corporate governance. 
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A comparative study of the law in the United Kingdom will be undertaken with 
the aim to find an answer to the problem in this dissertation.  The reason for a 
comparative study is because company law and corporate governance principles in the 




1.4 STRUCTURE OF DISSERTATION 
A general introduction to the problem is given in Chapter 1. This chapter will deal with 
the proposal to examine the responsibilities of the board of directors in terms of the King 
III Report and the Code. The reason for this examination is because many reviews and 
changes to the corporate governance system have been made and the Companies Act 71 
of 2008 incorporates into statute for the first time provisions dealing with corporate 
governance. The introduction summarises what will be discussed in the preceding 
chapters. 
Chapter 2 provides a general overview of corporate governance and it also 
explains the regulatory framework of corporate governance in South Africa. The 
purpose of this chapter is to determine the nature of corporate governance. Once the 
nature of corporate governance is determined, the directors’ legal responsibilities can be 
ascertained. The definition and the importance of corporate governance are also 
analysed. Lastly, the impetus for new corporate governance legislation is analysed. This 
is necessary in order to fully appreciate the reasons for all the changes in the new Act. 
The main aim of this analysis is to point out the shortcomings in the old Act and to 
determine the reasons why the legislature decided to reform the old Act. 
Chapter 3 analyses the legal and regulatory framework of corporate governance 
in the South Africa. The main aim of this analysis is to determine the legal and 
regulatory requirements that companies have to comply with and the penalties for non-
compliance. 
Chapter 4 examines the legal enforceability of King III. Such an examination 
therefore requires research into the enforceability and efficacy of King III. It is therefore 
also necessary to examine the responsibilities of the board of directors in terms of the 
King III and to determine the relationship between King III and the Companies Act 71 
of 2008.  
Chapter 5 discusses the background and development of corporate governance in 
the United Kingdom. The different committees and reports are therefore distinguished. 
                                                          
13
 For a study of the various purposes and objectives of comparative research, see DH van Zyl Beginsels 
van Regsvergylyking (1981) 17-34 and F Venter, AJ van der Walt, CFC van der Walt, NJJ Olivier, GJ 
Pienaar and LM du Plessis Regsnavorsing Metode en Publikcasie (1990) 207-217. 
5 
 
The aim is to point out the similarities and important differences between the two 
countries legal and regulatory framework and ultimately to find an answer to the main 
problem in this dissertation. 
Chapter 6 summarises the main arguments of this dissertation and 
recommendations are made for the legislature and policy makers to improve corporate 
governance practices in South Africa. 
 
1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The proposed research involves an examination of the relevant South African and 
foreign legislation with regard to the responsibilities of the board of directors in 
promoting the principles of corporate governance. Case law, books, articles and research 
reports will be used to amplify the research. A comparative study of the law in the 
United Kingdom will also be carried out. The main purpose of the comparative study is 
to find a solution to the problem in this dissertation. 
In general, a comparative study involves a systematic examination designed to 
explain similarities and differences between nations or regions. The comparative method 
compels us to identify similarities and differences, and then to account for them. In 
comparative law, a deep understanding of different legal systems could lead to lessons to 
be learned from each system that could influence the development of law and possibly 
lead to emulation and practical attempts to unify or harmonise law.
14
 
Furthermore, a comparative study seems to be particularly important as section 
5(2) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 provides that: ‘[t]o the extent appropriate, a court 
interpreting or applying this Act may consider foreign company law’. This is 
complimentary to section 5(1), which directs that the Act ‘must be interpreted and 
applied in a manner that gives effect to the purpose of section 7’. Section 7(e) states that 
one of the purposes of the Act is to ‘continue to provide for the creation and the use of 
companies, in a manner that enhances the economic welfare of South Africa as a partner 
in the global economy’. 
 
                                                          
14
 Phillip C Aka ‘Corporate Governance in South Africa: Analyzing the Dynamics of Corporate 
Governance Reforms in the Rainbow Nation’ (2007) 33 North Carolina Journal of International Law and 
Commercial Regulation 254-255. In this analysis Aka provides an overview, inter alia of South Africa 
and the scholarship on the law of comparative corporate governance. He further provides that the 
comparative corporate governance scholarship seeks to understand and illuminate approaches 
governments in various regions of the world take relating to the regulation of the corporation, with 





CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a general overview of corporate governance in South Africa. The 
main purpose of this chapter is to determine the nature of corporate governance. Once 
the nature of corporate governance is determined, the board of directors’ legal 
responsibilities can be established. An attempt is made to define corporate governance 
and the importance for companies to practice good corporate governance is established. 
Moreover, an analysis on the need for new corporate governance legislation in South 
Africa is also provided. The main objective of this analysis is to point out the 
shortcomings in the 1973 Act and to determine the legislatures’ reasons for reforming 
the 1973 Act. 
Corporate governance in South Africa was first institutionalised with the 
publication of the first King Report on Corporate governance in 1994 (King I). This was 
followed in 2002 by the second King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa 
(King II), placing South Africa at the forefront of countries regulating in favour of 
superior governance standards. The release of King II brought about increasing 
recognition of the fact that company law and codes of good governance practice are 
mutually dependent and that, in many respects the out-dated company law regime 
imposed by the 1973 Act hindered rather than advanced economic activity in the 
company. In 2004, the South African Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) published 




, proposing a new 
company law regime aimed at promoting the development of a fertile environment for 
economic activity. The aim was, ultimately, to repeal the 1973 Act and to replace it with 
a consolidated hub of company legislation which would simplify the law relating to the 
formation of corporate entities; encourage entrepreneurship and investment by 
rationalising the process and costs associated with the administration of companies; 
encourage greater transparency, efficiency and accountability by companies and their 
directors and make our company law regime consistent with best practice jurisdictions 
internationally.
 16
 The overhaul of South Africa’s corporate law regime follows similar 
processes in Australia (2004), Ireland and the UK (2006), the Channel Islands (2008), 
                                                          
15
 The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) policy paper South African Company Law for the 21st 
Century: Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform (General Notice 1182 in Government Gazette 26493 of 23 
June 2004). Available at http://www.pmg.org.za/bills/040715companydraftpolicy.pdf [accessed 28 
January 2014]. 
16
 Ibid para 12. 
7 
 
certain European countries (notably Italy and Switzerland in 2008) and China. The 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 was signed into law in April 2009 and the third King Report 





2.2 THE NATURE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
The key to a proper understanding of the concept of corporate governance is to 
understand two terms: corporate law and corporate finance. Corporate law recognises, as 
a formal matter, three different groups: shareholders, directors, and officers. Corporate 
law gives each of these groups certain rights and imposes certain obligations with 
respect to the operation of the enterprise. It also regulates the distribution of rights and 
duties between the three groups. Corporate law is essentially concerned with creation 
and or availability of the corporate form for two primary purposes, namely: (1) to 
facilitate and regulate the process of raising capital for the business operations of a 
company (corporate finance), and (2) to impose controls on persons whose power is 
derived from the finance that the use of the corporate form has put at their disposal or 




Corporate finance law deals with the way in which a company raises money for 
its business operations and how the company deals with its finances generally. By 
comparison, corporate governance focuses mainly on the systems by which companies 
are directed and controlled. It is the collection of law and practices, grounded in 
fiduciary duties and their application, that regulates the conduct of those in control of a 
corporation, and the means through which a variety of countries provide a legal basis for 
corporations while preserving, to some extent, authority to control abuses of these 
business organisations. Issues involved in the law and study of corporate governance 
include formation and dissolution of companies, financing, structures such as board of 
directors and shareholders, the importance of the corporate constitution, duties and 
responsibilities of those controlling companies, the importance of company meetings, 




The two key elements of governance concern supervising or monitoring 
management performance, and ensuring accountability of management to shareholders 
                                                          
17
 Ramani Naidoo Corporate Governance: An Essential Guide for South African Companies 2ed (2009) 1-
2. 
18
 Aka op cit note (14) 238. 
19
 Ibid 238-239. 
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and other stakeholders. The reference to other stakeholders makes the important point 
that the role of corporations in society has evolved from one where its responsibilities 
were seen as being exclusively to shareholders, to one where other stakeholders, such as 
employees and suppliers, is acknowledged. Furthermore, many corporations are of such 
size that their influence pervade society as a whole and the general public can be 
regarded as a stakeholder, albeit and indirect one. There is therefore a fundamental 
debate
20
 as to the relationship between the company and its stakeholders, which will 
affect the way in which corporate governance is viewed.
21
 
From the above it is apparent that corporate law and corporate finance are two totally 
distinct concepts. It is also apparent that corporate law contains an element of corporate 
finance; however, corporate finance does not. Corporate finance deals mainly with the 
financial aspects of the business. It is therefore my understanding that you cannot have 
corporate law without corporate finance. Corporate law also contains an element of 
corporate governance, at which an attempt is made to provide a definition on this 
subject. 
 
2.3  DEFINITION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
There is no set definition as to what corporate governance means. Critics often speak of 
corporate governance as an indefinable term, something - like love and happiness – 
which we essentially know the nature of, but for which words do not provide an accurate 
picture. Academics
22
 have attempted to lay down a working definition of corporate 
governance, yet one definition varies from the other, and this often leads to confusion.
23
 
Corporate governance is concerned with the structures and processes associated 
with management, decision-making and control in organisations.
24
 The most 
authoritative definition of corporate governance in the United Kingdom was provided by 
                                                          
20
 See Jean Jacques du Plessis, James McConvill, Mirko Bagaric Principles of Contemporary Corporate 
Governance (2007) 3-6 for a discussion on the origins of the corporate governance debate and the 
stakeholder debate and for analysis on the protection of different stakeholders by directors when they 
manage a company, with specific reference to the stakeholder provisions in King III, see Irene-Marié 
Esser ‘The Protection of Stakeholder Interests in Terms of the South African King III Report on 
Corporate Governance: An Improvement on King II?’ (2009) 21 SA Merc LJ 188-201 and also see I Esser 
and JJ Du Plessis ‘The Stakeholder Debate and Directors’ Fiduciary Duties’ (2007) 19 SA Merc LJ 346-
363 for a comparative analysis of the stakeholder debate and directors’ fiduciary duties’ in the United 
Kingdom and in South Africa. 
21
 Tom Wixley and Geoff Everingham Corporate Governance 3ed (2010) 2. 
22
 There is however no general definition of corporate governance, for an analysis of the concept 
‘corporate governance’, essential corporate governance principles and the meaning of corporate 
governance, see Du Plessis op cit note (19) 1-13. 
23
 Ibid 1. 
24
 Wixley and Everingham op cit note (21) 1. 
9 
 
the Cadbury Committee, which reported on the Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance in 1992.
25
 The Cadbury Committee’s report defined corporate governance 
as ‘the system by which companies are directed and controlled’.  
The Cadbury Committee further expanded on this definition
26
: 
‘Boards of directors are responsible for the governance of their companies [emphasis 
added]. The shareholders’ role in governance is to appoint the directors and the auditors 
and to satisfy themselves that an appropriate governance structure is in place. The 
responsibilities of the board include setting up the company’s strategic aims, providing 
the leadership to put them into effect, supervising the management of the business and 
reporting to shareholders on their stewardship. The board’s actions are subject to laws, 
regulations and the shareholders in general meeting.’ 
In this relationship, responsibility rests with directors to establish the company’s 
policies and to supervise how the company is managed. The directors are, in turn, 
accountable to the shareholders. Auditors have a role of acting as a representative for the 
shareholders collectively by guarding against financial irregularities and aiming for the 
directors to provide a ‘true and fair view’ of the company’s performance. As the 
shareholders supply equity capital to the company, they seek maximisation of their 
financial return from the company, so that the single overriding objective shared by all 
listed companies, whatever their size or type of business, is the preservation and the 




2.4 THE IMPORTANCE OF GOOD CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
The major advantages of good corporate governance lie in the increased ability of 
properly governed companies to attract institutional and foreign investment, to 
implement sustainable growth, and to identify and manage their business and other risks 
within pre-determined parameters, thereby limiting their potential liability. In the contest 
for scarce skills and human talent, properly governed companies with a reputation for 




                                                          
25
 Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, Report of the Committee on the 
Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Sir Adrian Cadbury, Chair) (1992) para 2.5. Available at 




 Boyle and Birds’ op cit note (10) 366. 
28
 Naidoo op cit note (17) 10. 
10 
 
The inability to access capital at competitive rates remains a major inhibitor to 
the growth of many companies, both public and private, and indeed of many developing 
countries, and where once corporate governance may have been regarded as a ‘soft 
issue’, the quality of potential investee company’s corporate governance is now ranked 
alongside its returns on investment ratios in determining whether a potential investor 
will invest in that particular company. A country’s reputation regarding governance 
issues is a collage of its legal and regulatory approach to corporate governance and the 
conduct of individual players in its economy.
29
 
‘Markets exists by the grace of investors … No market has a divide right to investors’ 
capital … If the country does not have a reputation for strong corporate governance 
practices, capital will flow elsewhere. If investors are not confident with the level of 
disclosure, capital will flow elsewhere. If a country opts for lax accounting and reporting 
standards, capital will flow elsewhere. All enterprises in that country – regardless of 




The Stanford Law School conducted a study to examine the relationship between 
a company’s corporate governance behaviour and its market value. It showed that 
institutions looking to invest in emerging economies were much likely to invest money 
in companies that had sound corporate governance practices. With the release of King 
III in 2009, South Africa has undeniably one of the best corporate governance 
frameworks worldwide, but this country, and indeed much of Africa, still lag far behind 
other emerging markets in its ability to attract foreign direct investment.
31
 
Bribery is recognised by the World Bank as the single greatest obstacle to 
economic and social development, and there is an abundance of empirical data to 
support the view that corruption pushes up the price of doing business in a country. 
Investors are warned to adhere to the Constitution of South Africa, 1996 and 
environment legislation in South Africa, such as the National Environmental 
Management Act 107 of 1998 which defines our environment rights as South Africans, 
and establishes a clear liability and duty of care on any party who, directly or indirectly, 
contributes to the transgression of those rights.
32
 
Public interest in corporate governance has amplified with the increase, in the 
last decade, of high corporate scams resulting in huge losses.  Companies that took 
decades to build had to be all but nationalised and bailed out by government loans or, 
left unaided, fell into ruin, and billions have been lost through the unbridled greed of 
management and the gross negligence of boards. In the bull market, the approach of 
                                                          
29
 Ibid 10-11. 
30




 Ibid 18-20. 
11 
 
investors is normally far more laissez-fairre, with ‘the soothing sound of share prices 
constantly ticking upwards’ tending to lull investors into worrying less about the 
management of their investments and integrity of the company’s directors. However, in 
tough economic times, investors and public tend to keep a more watchful eye on the way 
companies are being run and, spurred by shareholder activists and the media, are 
increasingly demanding greater accountability and better corporate citizenship from 
companies. When the dust of the most recent spate of corporate implosions has 
eventually settled, investors will again be lulled into complacency until the next 
governance glitch happens. Nevertheless, for now, issues of proper corporate 
governance, transparency and accountability remain at the center-stage and are 
fundamental to a company for a sustainable future.
33
 
Institutional shareholders are demanding greater accountability from companies 
they own, not the general public. It has been said that good corporate governance 
matters more in times of crisis, as it helps companies withstand economic shock.
34
 
To some extent, bankruptcies are a cynical occurrence, and all corporate failures 
can be laid at the door of poor corporate governance. Other factors such as unexpected 
interest-rate hikes, currency and demand fluctuations, natural disasters, and health issues 
such as the HIV/AIDS pandemic may sometimes force an adequately run company out 
of business. In light of the recent governance failures, shareholders, banks and investors 
are becoming increasingly selective about the companies with which they do business. 
The majority of recent corporate failures can clearly be attributed to bad business plans, 





2.5 THE IMPETUS FOR NEW CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE LEGISLATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
The economy and commercial activity are impacted significantly by company law. 
Company law can encourage and facilitate commercial enterprises and economic growth 
or it can restrict and retard it. It is therefore of fundamental importance for company law 
to be comprehensible, certain and accessible. The previous company law regime was 
criticised as being bulky, complex and full of inconsistency in its underlying philosophy 
and policy. The 1973 Act was amended about forty-two times in the thirty-seven years 
of its existence. This sort of pieced together and piecemeal reform led to conflict in the 
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policy and objectives underpinning the previous company law regime. The 1973 Act 
was too cumbersome, complex, archaic and excessively technical.
36
 
Moreover, during the thirty-seven years of existence of the 1973 Act, both the 
domestic and global environment has radically changed.  Several of the traditional 
company law doctrines and concepts inherited from nineteen-century English law have 
been abandoned or substantially modified. New company law concepts have been 
developed, such as the solvency and liquidity test, delinquent directors, corporate 
governance, new standards of accountability and transparency, market manipulation, and 
new ideas and approaches to corporate rescue, mergers and amalgamations and 
shareholder appraisal rights. The underpinning principle is that legislation (such as the 
1973 Act) that has outlived its usefulness and that is stifling the development of the 





 likewise state that:  
‘We live in a world of greater globalisation, increased electronic communication, greater 
sensitivity to social and ethical concerns, greater competition for capital, goods and 
services, and increased mobility of international capital that emphasises the importance 
of investor-friendly domestic laws’. 
Over and above all this, there has been dramatic socio-political and 
economic change in South Africa as well as a new constitutional dispensation.  
Apart from an investor friendly-corporate law regime, the DTI emphasises, as 
major themes of corporate law reform programme, the importance of a corporate 
law system that is flexible, simplified, modernised and transparent.
39
 
The DTI articulated three interrelated impetuses that collectively form the need 
for the overhaul of the law of corporate governance in South Africa. The DTI seeks to 
accomplish: (1) a changing environment, (2) a new constitutional dispensation, and (3) 
the imperativeness of modernisation.
40
 
Regarding the first impetus, the policy paper enumerated issues within and 
outside South Africa that have contributed to fundamental changes in the environment in 
which business operates, and highlighted the need for domestic laws to be investor 
friendly and competitive within the international trends. These issues include greater 
globalisation, increased electronic communication, greater sensitivity to social and 
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ethical concerns, fast changing markets, greater competition for capital, goods and 
services, and mobility of international capital.
41
 
The second impetus is mainly concerned with the adoption of the post-apartheid 
Constitution of 1996. Chapter 2 of the Constitution provides for the ‘Bill of Rights’ 
which enshrines the rights of all people in the country and affirms the democratic values 
of human dignity, equality and freedom. It forms a cornerstone of democracy in South 
Africa. The Constitution and the principles it promotes are then reflected in the policies 
and legislative programs that have taken place since 1994, such as environmental 
regulation and affirmative action laws, like the BEE Act (now Broad-Based Black 
Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003), designed to promote inclusion for blacks.
42
 
The third impetus focuses on the necessity for modernisation of the current 
corporate law regime that includes companies. The aim is a company law, which is up-
to-date, competitive and designed for a modern company that is not only a domestic 
institution operating in a new environment but also an international competitor, with 
careful consideration paid to developments and best practices internationally, while 
keeping also in mind the local context and peculiarities of South Africa.
43
 
This last impetus is directed at two main problems. The first is that the 1973Act 
is full of highly formalistic and economically unrealistic rules that make it burdensome 
and costly to form and manage an enterprise. These rules may also, encourage sham 
compliance with provisions. This needs to be changed to afford South African 
businesses the flexibility they need to raise capital in a global environment that requires 
responsiveness and innovation. Certain areas of importance which necessitates attention 
include the rules governing the duties and liabilities of directors now largely left to 
common law and Codes of Corporate Practice, and the administration of corporate 
governance rules, under the current law marked by a lack of enforcement and recourse.
44
 
The second main problem is that, no comprehensive reform of the out-dated and 
unfashionable legal framework built on foundations, which were put in place in 
Victorian England in the middle of the nineteenth century, has taken place, when a broad 
range of countries or jurisdictions within and beyond Africa, including Australia, 
Botswana, Canada, Hong Kong, and the United Kingdom, have undertaken extensive 
reviews of their domestic company law. Indeed, during the same period, a series of 
spectacular corporate failures have focused attention upon the need for improved 
corporate governance in many countries. South Africa has also had its own share of 
failures represented by the collapse of companies like Leisurenet and Regal Bank. The 
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net effect of such occurrences has been that investor confidence around the world, and 
particularly in the U.S., has been badly shaken by events at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, 
Adelphia, Vivendi and Parmalat. The actions of a small number of people have had 
immense repercussions on the whole business community.
45
 
The most important factor around which, for the DTI, these various factors 
combine is the importance of good corporate governance for the South African 
economy. Corporations, in various forms, are central to the country’s economy and its 
prosperity, in that they are tools for wealth creation and social renewal. A company law 
regime that is clear, facilitating, predictable and consistently enforced can create a 
protective and fertile environment for economic activity.
46
 
Therefore, the DTI prescribes the five steps, summarised in the policy paper that 
it designed to promote the competitiveness and development of the South African 
economy using company law. The contribution of corporate governance to economic 
development becomes particularly urgent considering the fact that despite the vision of 
the government and the magnificent strides achieved in the post-apartheid period, one 
review on the first ten years of majority rule found that the country continues to be 
saddled by two economies.
47
 
King I was released in 1994 and broke new ground in corporate governance at 
the time it was published: it formalised the need for companies to recognise they no 
longer operated independently from the societies in which they operate by advocating an 
integrated approach to good governance that includes principles of good social, ethical 
and environmental practice. Thereafter, King II was published in 2002/3 and built on the 
changes in corporate governance that the 1994 report introduced by acknowledging a 
shift away from the single bottom line to a triple bottom line. This means that companies 
should consider economic interests along with social and environmental factors in their 
corporate decision making, all the while keeping in mind that they are ultimately 
accountable to the company or body of shareholders. King II tracked the findings of an 
important study conducted in South Africa from 2001-2002 that demonstrated that 
shareholders and other investors attach importance to corporate governance and are 
willing to pay a premium for the shares of a well-governed company over a poorly 
managed company with a comparable financial record.
48
 
The Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct imposed a requirement on 
companies to comply or explain. Under this Code regime, affected corporations, such as 
listed companies, banks, financial and insurance institutions, and certain categories of 
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public sector enterprises, must comply with provisions in the Code. If they fail to 
comply, they must justify their non-compliance in their annual reports.
49
 
Although unveiled in the wake of corporate failures in both South Africa and 
abroad, it is interesting that the United States and South Africa took different approaches 
to dealing with the problem: the United States achieved compliance through the threat of 
legal sanctions represented in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, while South Africa 





 appears to share the view of the DTI that the occurrence of 
fundamental changes in the business environment in which businesses operate is 
necessary in reforming corporate governance principles. He commented that because we 
live in an era where investment can be moved from one part of the world to another with 
the click of a mouse, the main objective of a reformed company law should be the 
encouragement of foreign direct investment. Mongalo also wants serious note to be 
taken of the fact that corporate law is becoming increasingly globalised, where all 
countries are fighting for investor capital. Along with the DTI, Mongalo embraces the 
impetus relating to a new constitutional dispensation dictating a move away from 
conventional corporate governance principles. In justifying this wholly integrated 
approach to corporate governance, Mongalo, like the DTI, pointed to South Africa’s 
post-apartheid constitution whose provisions, including its supremacy clause, and stated 
that it mandated a more harmonious balancing of shareholder investor interests and 
those of the public or other stakeholders and counselled dispensation with the most 
exclusive principles of conventional governance law.
52
 
Mongalo and the DTI believes South African corporate governance law to be 
sorely out-dated and in dire need of modernisation. As a result of the increased 
globalisation of the South African economy in a number of areas, the current framework 
of corporate governance in the country is holding back, rather than facilitating 
competitiveness, growth and investment. The embedment of South Africa’s law of 
corporate governance in English law and the law’s lag in modernisation have led to 
unfortunate consequences, at a substantial cost to businesses and the economy. The DTI 




Foreign direct investment from all quarters of the globe is crucial to South 
Africa’s economic growth. Given this occurrence, a good system of corporate 
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governance must be in place. Mongalo agrees that there are many reasons why 
businesses fail that have little or nothing to do with how they are managed, but insisted 
that most of the classic collapses during the past decades can be attributed to the failure 
of conventional corporate governance principles (I concur).
54
 
Lastly, in some respects, Mongalo’s recommendations for change parallel that of 
the proposals DTI made for promoting the competitiveness and development of South 
Africa’s economy through company law, but in other respects, his recommendations 
exceed those of DTI, for example, Mongalo advised that a balance be struck between 
self-regulation and state intervention. A framework of company law that is too 
interventionist, may have the opposite effect of chasing away the investment necessary 
for economic development. Mongalo recommended the codification or regulation by 
legislation of directors’ duties to correct the present situation characterised by so many 
sources of duties of directors, namely, the common law, statute, and codes of good 
practice, which all operate in tandem. However, principles only suitable for certain 
businesses, like listed companies, should be left as codes of good practice, given that 
these codes have the advantage of flexibility in the sense that individual companies can 
apply them in a way that best fits their own circumstances and, compared to statutes, the 
codes are easier to update.
55
 
In reforming the United Kingdom company law, it was pointed out that the 
intention of the corporate law reform of the United Kingdom was to encourage 
companies to take an appropriate long-term perspective to develop productive 
relationships with employees and in the supply chain and to take seriously their ethical, 






This chapter has analysed the nature and definition of corporate governance, which is 
very much linked to each other. It is accordingly submitted that there is no general 
definition of corporate governance. Corporate governance refers to a system whereby 
companies can be directed and controlled. This is the most authorative definition of 
corporate governance according to Sir Adrian Cadbury. 
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From the above it is clear that the impetus for the good corporate governance in 
companies is mainly because of the series of corporate collapses worldwide and the need 
to restore investor confidence in the market.  Financial objectives, inter alia are 
expressed to be the driving factor underpinning contemporary corporate governance 
regulation.  Furthermore, the previous South African corporate law regime was out-
dated and in need of modernisation.  It is submitted that the need for reforming the 
corporate governance principles occurred as a result of fundamental changes in the 
commercial environment in which businesses operate.  
Consequently, the above recommendations submitted by the DTI for the 
overhaul of corporate governance law in South Africa were imperative for business to 
succeed in the modern society. I strongly concur with the DTI and Mongalo’s 
recommendation that good corporate governance is imperative for the South African 
economy. 
The many corporate collapses of companies’ world-wide and in South Africa are 
confirmation that the past corporate governance practices were in-effective and is 
evidence of a need for reform. It is my view that, if the DTI did not take such steps 
above, South African company law would be out-dated, un-competitive, un-fit for the 
modern business world and would ultimately result in more corporate collapses and 

















THE LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, the regulatory framework of corporate governance in South Africa is 
analysed. The main goal of this analysis is to determine the legal and regulatory 
requirements that companies have comply with and the penalties for non-compliance. 
Corporate governance must be considered against the background of a country’s 
broader legal context. Companies exist within a governance framework which is set by 
the law, regulations, codes of best practice such as the King Reports, the company’s own 
constitutional structure provided by its memorandum of incorporation and the policies 
adopted by its board of directors to guide its day-to-day operations. The efficiency with 
which the governance framework in a country operates depends on how effective the 
legal and regulatory environment is, the level of shareholder awareness and activism 
which exists, and the approach of funders and institutional investors to the companies in 
which they invest. The value of a robust legal framework – based on the principles of an 
unassailable constitution, an independent judiciary and due process of the law – in 





3.2 THE COMPANIES ACT 71 OF 2008 
The Companies Act of 2008 was signed into law on 8 April 2009. The Act came into 
effect on 1 May 2011 after substantial amendment by the Companies Amendment Act 3 
of 2011. It consists of a mere 225 sections and five schedules coupled with 179 
regulations and three annexures.
58
 It is indeed a succinct piece of legislation.
59
 
The Act not only sets out how a company acquires legal personality and raises funds, 
but incorporates into statute for the first time provisions dealing with corporate 
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governance since the limited liability company was introduced in South Africa by the 
Joint Stock Companies Limited Liability Act 23 of 1861 in the Cape.
60
 
The Act provides the legal structure in terms of which companies are created and 
empowered. Companies are creatures of statute, and cannot exist unless they are created 
in terms of the law and given certain powers in terms of the memorandum of 
incorporation (section 15). Companies, in particular state owned entities, may also be 
created in terms of their own founding legislation, for example the Broadcasting Act 4 
of 1999 in respect of the South African Broadcasting Corporation. Company law defines 
the manner in which companies come into existence; it defines their objects, authorities, 
rights and obligations as separate legal entities; the offences of which they are capable 
and the penalties applicable to those offences. Overall, compliance with all applicable 
legislation remains the accountability of the company’s board of directors, although the 
day-to-day responsibility for this function is usually delegated to executive management 
with the board exercising an oversight role.
61
 
Section 66(1) provides that: 
‘The business affairs of a company must be managed by or under the direction of its 
board of directors, which has the authority to exercise all the powers and perform any of 
the functions of the company, except to the extent that the Act or the company’s 
memorandum of incorporation provides otherwise.’ 
 
This provision is highly significant in that, for the first time in our Companies 
Act, the board of directors has been assigned the legal duty and responsibility of 
managing the affairs of a company. Section 66(1) of the Act is a concession to reality by 
acknowledging that the raison d’ étre for the appointment of the board of directors is the 
management of the company’s business. But, notably, the board’s powers may be 
curtailed by the Act or by the company’s memorandum of incorporation.
62
 
Section 66(2) provides that a private company has to have at least one director 
and a public company at least three directors. In the governance of a company, its 
business is managed by senior management under the direction of the board. In this 
regard, two of the board’s main functions are the appointment of the company’s chief 
executive, to lead the management team, and the approval of the strategic direction of 
the company, in both the short and the long term.
63
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Chapter 2, Part F of the Act provides for ‘Governance of Companies’. The two 
main organs of a company are the board of directors and the shareholders in a 
shareholders’ meeting. The Act sets out procedural rules relating to the convening of 
shareholders’ meetings
64
, the provision of notice of meetings
65
, attendance at meetings
66
, 
the conduct of meetings
67




 at meetings. It is 
essential that these formalities be complied with so that the business transacted at a 
shareholders’ meeting is not open to being expunged on the grounds of non-compliance, 
or because of irregularities in the proceedings – albeit that in some instances compliance 
with some formalities is not required.
70
 
For the first time in our company law regime, the common-law fiduciary duties 
of directors
71
 are set out in the Act. It is a ‘one size fits all’ approach and thus a 
disadvantage. The object of this partial codification of the fiduciary duties of directors 
was to ensure that directors are easily made aware of their fiduciary duties and that the 
fiduciary duties are easily accessible to directors.
72
 
The Act sets out rules relating to the appointment of directors
73
, grounds of 
ineligibility and disqualification of persons to be directors
74
, the removal of directors
75
, 







, resolutions of directors
79
, remuneration of directors
80
, 
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Section 73(1) provides that a director authorised by the board may call a board 
meeting at any time and a meeting must be called if required by at least 25 per cent of 
the directors where the board has 12 or more members or by at least two directors where 
the board has fewer than 12 members.
83
 
Section 73(3) provides that board meeting may be conducted electronically.
84
 
Given modern technological advances, it is now possible to hold a meeting without all 
members being physically present in the same room, as they can electronically ‘be in the 
presence’ of one another through web-based or video-conferencing facilities.
85
 
Chapter 3 of the Act is titled ‘Enhanced Accountability and Transparency’, 
which provides that every public company and state-owned company must have a 
company secretary
86
 and an audit committee
87
, as well as having an external auditor.  
The duties of a company secretary are set out in section 88 and they must 
provide, inter alia, guidance to directors as to their duties and responsibilities and ensure 
that minutes are kept of all shareholders’ and board meetings. In regard to the 
appointment of auditors, the individual acting as the designated auditor of the external 
audit team cannot be appointed for more than five consecutive financial years. Members 
of the audit committee must be directors of the company, but not involved in the day-to-
day management of the company, or full time employment of the company or being a 
material supplier or customer of the company, nor be related to any person who falls 
within any of the criteria set out above. While no qualifications for members of the audit 
committee are set out in the new Act, the Minister may prescribe minimum qualification 
requirements for members. The Act provides that the audit committee of a company has 
to nominate for appointment a registered auditor of the company, who is, in the opinion 
of the audit committee, independent. The audit committee has to determine the fees of 
the auditor and the nature and extent of any non-audit services that the auditor may 
provide to the company. The audit committee must prepare a report, which has to be 
included in the annual financial statements, describing how the audit committee has 
carried out its functions and commenting on the accounting practices and the internal 
financial controls of the company.
88
 
In addition to the provisions of the Companies Act of 2008, common law and 
King III, all companies incorporated in South Africa are required to comply with a 
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number of other laws which impose, albeit indirectly, certain governance obligations on 
the company and its directors.
89
  
The enforcement of the Act is of vital importance.
90
 The Act has decriminalised 
much of the conduct that was considered criminal under the 1973 Act. The object of 
decriminalising company law is not to trivialise the importance of effective sanctions for 
non-compliance, but to ensure more effective enforcement. However, the Act is not 
entirely without criminal penalties and attempts to keep criminal penalties to a 
minimum. It relies on an amalgamation of criminal penalties, civil remedies and 
administrative fines for enforcement. Overall responsibility of compliance with the Act 
is placed on the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (‘the Companies 
Commission’). It may investigate alleged contraventions of the Act and if it is found that 
a company has contravened it provisions, the Companies Commission may, inter alia 
decide to terminate the matter, refer the matter to the National Prosecuting authority or 
other regulatory authority, or resolve to issue a compliance notice. Failure to comply 
with a compliance notice may result in an administrative fine being levied by the court, 
which may not exceed the greater of 10 per cent of the company’s turnover during the 
period that the company failed to comply with the compliance notice, and the maximum 
fine of R1 million.
91
  
From the above, it is clear that the intention of the legislatures was to produce an 
Act that up to date with the modern corporation. The issue of corporate governance 
mainly applies to the board of directors and shareholders of a company. It is my 
understanding that should the board of directors or shareholders act contrary to the 
provisions of the act, this would result in non-compliance and a penalty would thus be 
incurred.  
 
3.3 THE COMMON LAW 
In addition to statutory duties prescribed by the Companies Act of 2008, there are 
certain common law duties incumbent on the directors and officers of a company. 
Common law is law which is not written in the statute books of a country but which, 
nevertheless, through custom, usage and court decisions, has gained force of law. 
Although several provisions of common law have been incorporated into the Act, the 
promulgation of Act does not replace the common law; in other words, the new Act 
                                                          
89
 Ibid. For example, the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 (as amended by Act 29 of 1999) 
imposes stringent reporting and financial accountability provisions in respect of governmental 
departments and state owned entities. See 34-36 for more examples and a brief summary of the other 
applicable Acts. 
90
 The enforceability of the Act is in contrast with enforceability of King III, see para 4.4. 
91
 Cassim op cit note (82) 26 and 833-837 for a full discussion on the Companies Commission. 
23 
 
reflects rather than replaces the common law. This is contrary to the position in the UK, 
where the enactment of the new UK Companies Act in 2006 specifically repealed and 




3.4 LEGAL PRECEDENT 
Legal and judicial precedent is a body of decisions which establishes a particular legal 
principle. In deciding subsequent cases with similar issues or facts, a court must 
consider, in addition to the law laid down by statute, the body of precedent on the issue. 
In certain circumstances, for instance where a decision has been handed down by a 
higher court such as the court of appeal, such precedent is considered mandatory 
precedent and must be followed by the lower court. Legal precedent, once established, 
forms part of common law. The 2008 Act codifies much of what has become accepted in 
our legal system through judicial precedent and common law. In interpreting the 
provisions of the Act, it is specifically contemplated in section 5 of the Act that, to the 
extent appropriate, the courts may consider foreign company law and the requirements 
of economic development and entrepreneurship as set out in section 7 of the Act. The 
clear intention of the drafters of the 2008 Act is therefore that it should continue to 
remain relevant to the South African business environment by being flexible and 
adaptive to changing circumstances.
93
  
In reflection, there is value to Act’s provision that allows the courts to consider 
foreign company law.  Seeing to it that the economy, business and regulatory 
environment in South Africa and around the world is constantly changing, it is therefore 
imperative to stay up-to-date with contemporary commercial practices, in addition to 




Regulations exist to assist the primary legislative process. In other words, primary 
legislation such as the Companies Act 71 of 2008 contains provisions which allow 
certain bodies established under the law to make regulations, in term of defined 
processes, on a range of matters within their areas of responsibility. This allows the law 
to be applied more effectively and with more flexibility having regard to the changing 
circumstances. Regulations therefore involve the prescripts of government agencies and 
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regulatory bodies put in place by the state for the governance of companies and the 
protection of investors. 
94
 
The Act establishes one new institution and adapts and transforms three existing 
ones. The three transformed regulatory agencies are the Companies Commission, the 
Takeover Regulation Panel, which was formerly the Securities Regulation Panel, and the 





3.6 THE JOHANNESBURG STOCK EXCHANGE (JSE) 
LISTING REQUIREMENTS 
Securities exchange regulations such as the JSE listing requirements
96
 determine the 
requirements that companies must fulfil in order to have their shares listed on the stock 
exchange. The listing requirements regulate the conduct of listed entities and companies 
planning to list their shares.
97
  
Paragraph 1.2 of the JSE listing requirements provides that listings are granted 
subject to compliance with the listings requirements and new applicants and their 
directors must comply with the listings requirements. In addition, the JSE may grant a 
listing subject to any additional condition(s) that it considers appropriate, in which event 
the new applicant will be informed of, and will be required to comply with, any such 
condition(s).  
Paragraph 1.11 provides that where the issuer has failed to comply with the 
listing requirements and it is in the best interest for listing to be terminated, the JSE may 
suspend or terminate a listing.  
Furthermore, paragraph 3.62 provides that all directors of listed companies are 
bound by and must comply with the listings requirements, as amended from time to 
time, in their capacities as directors and in their personal capacities. 
Paragraph 3.84 provides that issuers must comply with the specific requirements 
concerning corporate governance and must disclose their compliance therewith in their 
annual report.  
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Paragraph 8.63(a) read with paragraph 3.84 provides that issuers are required to 
disclose in the annual report and in the annual financial statements: 
‘(a) the King Code:  
(i) a narrative statement of how it has applied the principles set out in the King 
Code, providing explanation(s) that enable(s) its shareholders to evaluate how the 
principles have been applied; and  
(ii) a statement addressing the extent of the company’s compliance with the 
King Code and the reasons for non-compliance with any of the principles in the King 
Code, specifying whether or not the company has complied throughout the accounting 
period with all the provisions of the King Code and indicating for what part of the 
period any non-compliance occurred.’ 
It is submitted that the listing requirements, which are consistent with 
international best practice, greatly increase the discretionary powers of the JSE-listed 
entities. Listed companies are required to comply with the provisions of the King Code 




3.7 THE CODES OF GOOD GOVERNANCE: THE KING 
REPORTS ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
The King Committee was formed in 1992 by the Institute of Directors of Southern 
Africa. The King Committee was led by former judge Mervyn King to consider, inter 
alia, issues of financial reporting and accountability, good practice concerning the 
responsibilities of directors and auditors, and a code of ethical conduct for South African 
enterprises.  The King Committee was similar in concept to the Cadbury Committee 
which was disbanded on completion of its mandate and was succeeded, in time, by 
various other committees such as the Turnbury and Higgs Committees, the core of the 
King Committee continued to function to guide the evolution of South African corporate 
governance. The work of the King Committee remains the definitive South African 
standard on corporate governance.
99
 
The 1994 Report of the King Committee on Corporate Governance (King I) 
codified the standards of governance applicable to companies and other defined entities. 
For the first time in South Africa, the governance standards of companies listed on the 
main boards of the JSE Securities Exchange, large public entities as defined in the 
Public Entities Act 93 of 1992 (for example Telkom and Eskom), banks, financial and 
insurance companies and large unlisted public corporations (companies with 
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shareholders’ equity over R50 million) were regulated by more than just legislation. In 
March 2002, the King Committee published the second King Report on Corporate 
Governance for South Africa (King II). Following the release of King II in 2002, the 
JSE reviewed its listing requirements to make the application of the King Code 
mandatory for listed companies. Several of the recommendations contained in King I 
and II have been superseded by or incorporated into legislation, some of the more 
significant being the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act 75 of 1997, the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998, the Corporate 




A third report on Corporate Governance was required because of changes in the 
company law regime (brought about by the Companies Act 71 of 2008) as well as the 
need to ensure alignment with international governance trends. In a fundamental move 
away from the approach in King II (which applied to affected companies only), the new 
King Report sets out aspirational best practice governance standards for all companies 
and corporate entities. Underlying the shift away from the ‘comply or explain’ approach 
of King II – an approach which suggested an element of enforcement and sanctions 





3.8 THE ROLE OF MARKET FORCES 
Market forces is another source of influence, and perhaps control, over internal 
arrangements and management of the company, but does not sit comfortably under any 
of the classifications of regulation above. The significant role of market forces in 
contributing to good corporate governance and strong corporate performance has been 
emphasised in economic literature on corporation and company law. In fact, many 




 It is therefore submitted that market forces, although categorised as ‘soft law’, 
due to it constituting a form of corporate control, but control arising without any form of 
threat of direct legal sanction – are most significant than legal rules.
103
 
Most corporate governance codes are based on a ‘comply or explain’ approach. 
If companies adhere voluntarily because they consider that an elaborate corporate 
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governance statement is in their interests for creating confidence in the markets, third 
parties-especially investors, but also creditors are entitled to rely on the honest and 
complete nature of the statements. The ‘comply or explain’ technique therefore builds 




3.9  SUMMARY 
From the above, it is clear that companies in South Africa have to comply with many 
legal and regulatory requirements.
105
 Legislation, the common law, legal precedent, 
regulations, listing requirements, the Codes of good governance and market forces all 
impact on the manner in which companies do business. 
It is submitted that:  
‘corporate governance has been viewed by some as becoming increasingly prescriptive 
and more difficult to comply with, and, in a number of companies, governance has been 
relegated to an annual “form-ticking” exercise to which management, directors, and 
some even company’s auditors, pay mere lip-service’
106
  
However, I disagree, because based on history of company collapses and the 
archaic company law regime, there clearly was a lack of proper corporate governance 
regulation.  
 It is my opinion, if companies do not adhere to all the legal and regulatory 
framework of corporate governance, they would collapse, they will not be able to 
contend with larger companies on the JSE, they would not restore investor confidence in 
the markets and these companies would not be financially sustainable in the future. 
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THE LEGAL ENFORCEABILITY OF KING III 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
In this Chapter, the legal enforceability of King III examined. Such an examination 
therefore requires research into the enforceability and efficacy of King III. It is therefore 
also necessary to examine the responsibilities of the board of directors in terms of the 
King III and to determine the relationship between King III and the Companies Act 71 
of 2008.  
King III comprises of a Code of principles founded on an ‘apply or explain’ 
basis, a Report which amplifies the principles in the Code and contains the King 
Committee’s recommendations on governance best practice. Where practices are 
mandatory in terms of legislation, the Code uses the peremptory ‘must’ to distinguish 
these. Principles which are a requirement of good governance are differentiated by 
permissive ‘should’. In other words, a company must, in terms of the Companies Act 71 
of 2008 prepare annual financial statements for which the directors must accept 
responsibility; it should, in addition, indicate in its sustainability report the positive and 
negative impact of its operations on the environment. In contrast to the approach in King 
II, practical implementation guidelines are not included as part of the Code, but will be 
issued intermittently by the Institute of Directors in the form of Practice Notes. This will 




4.2 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN KING III AND THE 
COMPANIES ACT 71 OF 2008 
Section 7 of the Act provides that the purpose of the new Act is to promote compliance 
with the Bill of Rights, as provided for in the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996 in the application of company law. It is also designed to promote 
entrepreneurship, flexibility and simplicity in the formation and maintenance of 
companies and to encourage transparency and high standards of corporate governance. 
This statement in turn encourages an interaction between King III and the Act.
108
 
There is always a link between good governance and compliance with law. Good 
governance is not something that exists separately from the law and it is entirely 
inappropriate to unhinge governance from the law. The starting point of any analysis on 
this topic is the duty of directors and officers to discharge their legal duties. These duties 
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are grouped into two categories, namely: the duty of care, skill and diligence, and the 
fiduciary duties. As far as the body of legislation that applies to a company is concerned, 
corporate governance mainly involves the establishment of structures and processes, 
with appropriate checks and balances that enable directors to discharge their legal 
responsibilities, and oversee compliance with legislation.
109
 
In addition to compliance with legislation, the criteria of good governance, 
governance codes and guidelines will be relevant to determine what is regarded as an 
appropriate standard of conduct for directors. The more established certain governance 
practices become, the more likely a court would regard conduct that conforms with these 
practices as meeting the required standard of care. Corporate governance practices, 
codes and guidelines therefore lift the bar of what are regarded as appropriate standards 
of conduct. Consequently, any failure to meet a recognised standard of governance, 
albeit not legislated, may render a board or individual director liable at law. Around the 
world hybrid systems are developing. In other words, some of the principles of good 
governance are being legislated in addition to a voluntary code of good governance 
practice. In an ‘apply or explain’ approach, principles override specific recommended 
practices. However, some principles and recommended practices have been legislated 
and there must be compliance with the letter of the law.
110
 This does not leave room for 
interpretation. Also, what was contained in the common law is being restated in statutes. 
In this regard, the most important change is the incorporation of the common law duties 




4.3 THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE BOARD OF 
DIRECTORS IN TERMS OF KING III 
The King III Report requires the board of directors to provide effective leadership based 
on an ethical foundation.
112
 An ethical corporate culture means more than social 
philanthropy or charitable donations.
113
 The rationale for ensuring that the company is 
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The board must ensure that the company’s ethical performance is assessed, 
monitored, reported and disclosed,
115
 enabling users of ethics reports to form opinions 
and make decisions based on disclosed and verified information.
116
 
As far as sustainability is concerned, it is a primary moral and economic 




 and sustainability considerations are rooted in the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, which imposes responsibilities upon 
individuals and juristic persons for the realisation of the most fundamental rights.
118
 
The board should ensure that the company is, and is seen to be, a responsible 
corporate citizen
119
 which implies an ethical
120
 relationship of responsibility
121
 between 
the company and the society in which it operates.
122
 It is responsible for the strategic 
direction and control of the company.
123
 So the board should not only consider the 
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The board should draw up a code of conduct.
125
 The board should ensure that its 
conduct and that of management aligns to the set values and is adhered to in all aspects 
of its business.
126
 The board should ensure that all decisions and actions are based on 




The board of directors should act as the focal point and custodian of corporate 
governance.
128
 Furthermore, the board of directors should act in the best interests of the 
company.
129
 The Report recommends that every board should have a charter setting out 
its responsibilities and should meet as often as required to fulfil its duties, but preferably 
at least four times per year.
130
 
The board of directors has the responsibility to elect as a chairperson someone 
who is an independent non-executive director. The CEO of the company should not also 
fulfil the role of chairperson of the board.
131
 In addition, the board should appoint a CEO 
and establish a framework for the delegation of authority.
132
 The board should comprise 
a balance of power, with a majority of independent non-executive directors.
133
 Directors 
should be appointed through formal process.
134
 
The board of directors should strive to achieve the appropriate balance between 
its various stakeholder groupings, and is urged to take into account, as far as possible, 
the legitimate interests and expectations of its stakeholders when making decisions in 
the best interests of the company.
135
 
The board should ensure the integrity of the company’s integrated report, which 
should be prepared annually and should convey adequate information regarding the 
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company’s financial and sustainability performance.
136
 Integrated reporting enables 
stakeholders to better assess the value of a company. The board should furthermore 
ensure that the company complies with applicable laws and that it also considers 
adherence to non-binding rules, codes and standards.
137
 









Furthermore, the board should be responsible for dispute resolution and should 




Directors should be aware of the practicalities of business rescue proceedings.
142
 
In addition, the board and individual directors should be aware of and understand their 




The board should ensure that the company complies with applicable laws and 
considers adherence to non-binding rules, codes and standards.
144
 The board and each 
individual director should have a working understanding of the effect of the applicable 




4.4 THE ENFORCEABILITY AND EFFICACY OF KING III 
As stated above, King III is drafted on an ‘apply or explain’ basis. In following the 
‘apply or explain’ approach, the board of directors, in its collective decision making, 
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could conclude that to follow a recommendation would not, in the particular 
circumstances, be in the best interests of the company.
146
 The board could decide to 
apply the recommendation differently or apply another practice and still achieve the 
objective of the overarching corporate governance principles of fairness, accountability, 
responsibility and transparency. Explaining how the principles and recommendations 
were applied, or if not applied, the reasons, results in compliance.
147
  
However, its principles are not legally binding on these companies, unless their 
shares are listed on the JSE, in which case they are subject to the JSE listing 
requirements. On the other hand, companies whose shares are not listed on the JSE do 
not have to comply with King III.  
From the above, it is my understanding that King III is mandatory for companies 
who want list their shares on the JSE. In addition to King III, these companies also have 
to comply with the JSE listing requirements. The board of directors of listed companies 
are required to comply with the provisions of the King Code and state in their annual 
reports the extent and the reasons for any non-compliance.  
In addition, the board of directors of listed companies also still have to comply 
with the provisions of the Companies Act, which is mandatory for the board of directors 
of all companies and also contains various elements of corporate governance. 
Companies may, on a voluntary basis, choose whether it wants to list their shares on the 
JSE and comply with King III.  It is therefore submitted that King III, the JSE listing 
requirements and the Companies Act, mirror each other.  
Moreover, market forces
148
, even though it is not considered part of the legal 
regulation of corporate governance, has significant influence on the management, 
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In summary, corporate governance mainly involves the establishment of structures and 
processes, with appropriate checks and balances that enable directors to discharge their 
legal responsibilities, and oversee compliance with legislation. This is the link between 
governance principles and the law. Stated differently, these responsibilities of the board 
of directors’ under King III constitute legal duties.  
It is my understanding that King III is not enforced through legislation; it relies 
on self-regulation. There is no regulatory agency that is mandated to enforce King III 
and there is no sanction for non-compliance. However, enforcement takes place 
according to the JSE listing requirements. Listed companies are contractually bound to 
comply with King III and failure to follow the JSE listing requirements would amount to 
a breach of the listing requirements. Listed companies will have to comply with King III 
or be the JSE may suspend or terminate the listing. 
Furthermore, the board of directors has the responsibility to promote the 
principles of corporate governance in terms of King III. Since King III is drafted on an 
‘apply or explain’ basis, the board of directors, in its collective decision making, could 
conclude that to follow a recommendation would not, in the particular circumstances, be 
in the best interests of the company. The board could decide to apply the 
recommendation differently or apply another practice and still achieve the objective of 
the overarching corporate governance principles of fairness, accountability, 
responsibility and transparency.  
In the above analysis, it is evident that King III governs all the critical areas a 
company. It therefore submitted that King III impacts and changes the way a company 
normally conduct business. It is also submitted that although King III is voluntary for all 
companies and all companies should still strive to apply its principles as it would only 
benefit such company’s. 
In my view, King III is enforceable, but only to a certain degree. However, if 
King III is not strictly applied, the board of directors still have to prove that they were 
acting in the best interests of the company and explain their reasoning for deviating from 








COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: UNITED KINGDOM 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter the background and development of corporate governance in the United 
Kingdom is discussed.  It is therefore necessary to distinguish between the different UK 
committees and reports, since the goal is to point out the similarities and important 
differences between the South Africa and the United Kingdom’s regulatory framework 
and ultimately to find an answer to the problem in this dissertation. 
In the UK, concern about standards of financial reporting and accountability, 
heightened by a series of major corporate closes and a controversy over directors’ pay 
brought corporate governance to the center of attention. The global financial crisis raised 
many corporate governance issues and led to many reviews and changes to the corporate 
governance system in the UK and abroad. Notably, the Walker Review led to changes in 
the financial regulation and the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) replaced the 





5.2 BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIME IN THE 
UNITED KINGDOM 
The main impetus for better practices in corporate governance began in the UK in the 
late 1980’s.
150
 The development of better corporate governance practices came as a 
result of a series of corporate collapses and scandals in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. 
Since the beginning of the 1990’s the corporate governance debate has been 
shaped to a large degree by the work of the Cadbury, Greenbury, Hampel and the 
Turnbull Committee. The collapse of ENRON and other companies in the United States 
and Western Europe also led to further moves to strengthen the protections afforded by 
the corporate governance regime. The financial crisis also gave impetus to further 
reforms to the corporate governance system, many of which have implemented by and 
are overseen by the Financial Reporting Council.
151
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In the UK, companies are incorporated at country level and have to abide by the 
Companies Act 2006.
152
 In 1992, the UK produced the world’s first corporate 
governance report, leading to a formal corporate governance code. Subsequently, the 
UK has published more reports than any other country.
153
   
The Cadbury Report (1992) was produced by a committee chaired by Sir Adrian 
Cadbury. It was titled ‘The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance’, and was not 
intended to be a comprehensive review of the subject. The code was discretionary: UK 
listed companies were required to report that they had complied with the code or, if they 
had not, they had to state reasons for non-compliance.
154
 
The Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel committees were set up by the City of 
London institutions – that is, by the UK’s financial sector. The codes were essential 
voluntary and applied principally to listed companies, although it was suggested that 
many of the recommendations could be applied to private companies. In 1998, the 
Combined Code consolidated the Cadbury, Greenbury, and Hampel proposals, and was 
incorporated into the London Stock Exchange’s listing rules. The Combined Code set 
out standards of good practice on matters such as board composition, director 
remuneration, accountability, and audit in relation to shareholders. In these reports, 
companies had to confirm that they had complied with the Code’s provisions or, if they 
had not, provide explanations of why not. Although the code had no legislative basis and 
enforcement, failure to meet its requirements could lead to delisting from the London 
Stock Exchange. Formal de-listing, however, would tend to disadvantage the very 
shareholders whom the corporate governance codes were designed to protect, so 





 was revised in 2003 and again in 2006. In this later 
edition, the corporate governance requirements were grouped under four headings: 
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independence; diligence; professional development; board performance evaluation. 
These editions of the Combined Code were published by the FRC, which is the UK’s 
independent regulator responsible for promoting high-quality corporate governance, and 
which had by this time taken over regulatory responsibility from the London Stock 
Exchange. The FRC also regulates the UK professional accountancy bodies. Following 
the global financial crisis, beginning in 2008, the FRC reviewed the Combined Code, 
and renamed it the Corporate Governance Code (2010). This code sets out the standards 
of good practice in relation to board leadership and effectiveness, remuneration, 
accountability, and relations with shareholders. The Corporate Governance Code 
contains broad principles, plus some more specific provisions.
157
 
Similar to the Combined Code the Corporate Governance Code (2010) focuses 
on directors, remuneration of directors, accountability and audit and relations with 
stakeholders. The aim of the Code is to allow companies to create and establish their 
own governance policies in the light of the main and supporting principles. This seeks to 
offer flexibility for companies in order to take account of their diversity but within a 
broad framework of requirements. The listing rules require listed companies to describe 
their corporate governance in their annual report and accounts from two points of view. 
First, the company must report on how it applies and adheres to the Code’s principles. 
Again, it is for the companies to define and explain their own governance policies in the 
light of the principles, including any special circumstances applying to them which have 
led to a particular approach. It is for their shareholders and others to evaluate this part of 
the company’s statement. The company must confirm where it complies with the Code’s 
provisions. From the second point of view the company must describe its non-
compliance with any of the Code’s provisions. The comply or explain approach adopted 
in the Code is favoured as having been in operation since the Code’s beginnings in 1992 
and for the flexibility it offers which ‘is strongly supported by both companies and 
shareholders and has been widely admired and imitated internationally.’
158
 
In 2012 the FRC reviewed the 2010 version of the Corporate Governance Code. 
The new edition of the Code (Corporate Governance Code (2012)
 159
) was published 
in September 2012 and applies to reporting periods beginning on or after 1 October 
2012.
160
 Companies reporting on reporting periods beginning before 1 October 2012 
should continue to report against the June 2010 edition of the Code, although they are 
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encouraged to consider whether it would be beneficial to adopt some or all of the new 
provisions in the revised code earlier than formally expected.
161
 
The Corporate Governance Code sets out standards of good practice in relation 
to board leadership and effectiveness, remuneration, accountability and relations with 
shareholders. All companies with a premium listing of equity shares in the UK are 
required under the listing rules to report on how they have applied the Code in their 
annual report and accounts. The Code contains broad principles and more specific 
provisions. Again, listed companies are required to report on how they have applied the 
main principles of the Code, and either to confirm that they have complied with the 
Code’s provisions or - where they have not - to provide an explanation. Some of the 
provisions of the Code require disclosures to be made in order to comply with them.
162
 
Together with the Corporate Governance Code (2010) the Stewardship Code 
(2010) was published in July 2010 and is to be applied on a ‘comply or explain’ basis. 
The Code ‘aims to enhance the quality of the engagement between institutional investors 
and companies to help improve long term returns to shareholders and efficient exercise 
of governance responsibilities’.
163
 The Code however, does not require any dialogue 





There are many new regulatory developments in the UK since the 1990’s. The first 
being the Cadbury Report and after the global financial crisis in 2008, the FRC reviewed 
the Combined Code and renamed it the Corporate Governance Code (2010). This Code 
is however replaced with the 2012 version which applies to reporting periods beginning 
on or after 1 October 2012. 
From the above, it is clear that according to the 2010 and 2012 Codes, listed 
companies in the UK are governed on a ‘comply or explain’ basis. The ‘comply or 
explain’ approach first set out by the Cadbury Report has been retained in the all the 
Codes and Reports set up in the UK. Listed companies must comply with the Code’s 
provisions or confirm that they have complied with the Code’s provisions or provide an 
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 John Lowry and Arad Reisberg Pettet’s Company Law: Company Law and Corporate Finance 4ed 
(2012) 225-226. 
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 Ibid 228. This is in contrast with the approach taken in South Africa where relationships and dialogue 
between all stakeholders is required, see para 4.3 above. This is reflected in King III, Chapter 8 requires 




explanation when they do not. Non-compliance with the provisions of the Code is not a 
breach of the Code, but failure is.  
It is submitted that the chief distinguishing feature of the UK Reports is its 
reliance mainly on self-regulation. It is also interesting to note that, all the UK Reports 
deal with specific aspects of corporate governance, in contrast to that of South Africa, 
























CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 CONCLUSION 
The discussion above examines the responsibilities of the board of directors to promote 
the principles of corporate governance. The research has revealed that companies have 
to comply with many legal and regulatory requirements of corporate governance in the 
South Africa and in United Kingdom. 
After following a comparative methodology, it is submitted that the South 
African legal and regulatory framework with regard to corporate governance is very 
similar to that of the United Kingdom’s, however there are many differences as well. 
The reason for the legal and regulatory requirements was because of the global 
financial crisis, high profile corporate collapses and the previous corporate law regime 
was considered outdated and in need of modernisation. This has led to the DTI policy 
paper which articulated three interrelated impetuses that collectively form the need for 
the overhaul of the law of corporate governance in South Africa. It is submitted that the 
DTI have accomplished what it has set out to do. 
In addition, a new innovation of the Act is the incorporation corporate 
governance issues. Company law sets the framework in which the company operates and 
the recommended practices set out in the King III provides guidance for directors as to 
how they should direct the business of the company and make decisions on behalf of the 
company. It is submitted that the Act and King III complement each other.  
The Companies Act 71 of 2008 contains provisions which allow certain bodies 
established under the law to make regulations. Furthermore, securities exchange 
regulations such as the JSE listing requirements determine the requirements that 
companies must fulfil in order to have their shares listed on the stock exchange. Listed 




It is submitted that the link between governance principles and the law is stated 




The fact that King III operate on an ‘apply or explain’ basis and in the ‘apply or 
explain’ approach, the board of directors, in its collective decision making, could 
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conclude that to follow a recommendation would not, in the particular circumstances, be 
in the best interests of the company. The board could decide to apply the 
recommendation differently or apply another practice and still achieve the objective of 
the overarching corporate governance principles of fairness, accountability, 
responsibility and transparency. Explaining how the principles and recommendations 
were applied, or if not applied, the reasons, results in compliance.  
It is therefore submitted that these principles does not suit or apply or fulfil a 




Furthermore, the global financial crisis has raised many corporate governance 
issues and this has led to many reviews and changes to the corporate governance system 
in the UK.
168
 The Corporate governance Code contains broad principles and more 
specific provisions. Listed companies are required to report on how they have applied 
the main principles of the Code. They must either confirm that they have complied with 
the Code’s provisions or they must provide an explanation for non-compliance.
169
 
 The UK and South Africa have reformed their corporate governance regimes. 
The only logical conclusion that can be drawn from the above developments is the fact 
that both countries have shown that they strive for better corporate governance practices. 
This is evident from the different codes, reports, regulatory agencies, legislation and 
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In light of the summaries and conclusion above, the most important recommendations 
arising from this research are as follows: 
In South Africa, compliance with King III is mandatory for companies listed on 
the JSE, but for all other entities there is no statutory obligation to comply with King III 
Report and the Code. It is recommended that King III should be a mandatory code of 
best practice and should apply to all business entities and not just companies listed on 
the JSE. 
The DTI and Mongalo
170
 advocates for the imperativeness of good corporate 
governance for the South African economy. I strongly agree and recommend that all 
companies should strive for good corporate governance. 
It is submitted that corporate governance is becoming too prescriptive, more 
difficult for companies to comply with and the high cost of compliance is becoming a 
problem.
171
 It is therefore recommended that the legislature and policy makers provide 
financial assistance to smaller companies for costs associated with compliance and 
reimburse such companies if it applied with all King III principles. In so doing, it 
encourages and provides incentive for other companies to adhere to King III. 
Stakeholder interests have received no formal legal recognition under the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008. The Code strongly emphasises the importance of 
stakeholder interests and the triple bottom line or integrated approach that requires 
companies to have regard to social, economic and environmental concerns. It is 
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